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Executive Summary
The dimension of the human-induced ecological 
disaster in Central Asia is probably best illustrated 
in the desiccation of the Aral Sea. In I960 this 
water body had a surface area of more than 
68,000 square kilometers [km2) and was the 
fourth-Iargest freshwater lake in the world. In 2009 
only the “Small Aral," the western part of the 
"Large Aral," and a little pond from the eastern 
part of the "Large Aral" remained.
Much has been written and said on the causes and 
consequences of the vanishing Aral Sea. Numerous 
donors and international organizations have imple­
mented more than 20 large-scale projects worth 
about US$500 million in the Aral Sea Basin (ASB). 
Concurrently, much research has focused on how 
to reverse the negative trend or mitigate its nega­
tive impact on the environment, economy, and 
health of the people. Nonetheless, the Aral Sea has 
not been restored. Worse, in the past decade the 
remnants of the Aral Sea have desiccated even 
faster than calculations and model simulations pre­
dicted. The complete loss of the economical use of 
the Aral Sea threatens the livelihood and health of 
the population. The disastrous degradation of the 
ecosystems has led to the virtual extinction of 
unique flora and fauna and to a dramatic increase 
in human illnesses such as respiratory diseases, 
hepatitis, and anemia. Have all of the research and 
the efforts to save the Aral Sea been in vain? Can 
the Aral Sea, or at least part of it, still be saved? 
Or must the local and global communities focus 
merely on mitigating the severe environmental and 
human consequences of the sea's desiccation? And 
if so, how?
Your assignment is to formulate policy recom­
mendations for the riparian states in Central Asia 
to deal with the problems identified in this case.
Background
The Aral Sea lies between the two great deserts of 
Central Asia. Until the 1960s, the Aral Sea was the 
fourth-Iargest freshwater inland lake in the world, 
with a surface of 68,000 km2 and a volume of 
1,056 cubic kilometers (km3). This water body
annually yielded 40,000 metric tons1 of fish, while 
the deltas of its major tributaries hosted dozens of 
smaller lakes and biologically rich marshes and 
wetlands covering 550,000 hectares (ha). The Aral 
Sea Basin extends not only to five Central Asian 
countries, but also to Afghanistan and a small part 
of Iran (Figure I). The total area of the ASB is 180 
million hectares, of which 7.9 million hectares are 
irrigated with more than 95 km3 of water annually 
(Dukhovny and Sokolov 2003; Kijne 2005; Micklin 
2008). Irrigation water is delivered through 
323,000 km of canals [Orlovsky, Glantz, and 
Orlovsky 2000), and water outflow from irrigated 
fields is channeled through 190,000 km of drainage 
collectors and drains (Severskiy et al. 2005). Most 
of the people in the ASB reside within the area 
drained by the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, the 
two rivers that once flowed into the Aral Sea and 
whose waters originate in the Pamir and Tian Shan 
m ountains in T ajik istan , K yrgyzstan, and 
Afghanistan.
Feeding Rivers and Water Supply
The size of the Aral Sea depends largely on the 
balance between inflows from the two main feeding 
rivers [Figure 1) and the sea's net evaporation (that 
is, the difference between evaporation from the 
sea's surface and precipitation) (Micklin 2008). The 
ASB is characterized by high evaporation and low 
precipitation (Jarsjo et al. 2008). For centuries, the 
freshwater from the two rivers kept the Aral's 
water and salt at tolerable levels. In the middle of 
the 20th century the Amu Darya had an average 
annual flow of 77 km3 and the Syr Darya had a flow 
of 34 km3, whereas water use in the ASB amounted 
to about 117 km3 annually (Nandalal and Simonovic
2003). Between 80 and 95 percent of this water 
was used for irrigated agriculture and hence did 
not reach the Aral Sea (Kipshakbayev and Sokolov 
2002; Horinkova and Dukhovny 2004; Severskiy 
et al. 2005).
The drive for economic development by the 
former Soviet Union starting in the second half of 
the 20th century triggered the expansion of 
irrigated (cotton) production. Large dams were 
built in the upper reaches of both feeding rivers,
1 All tons in this case study are metric tons, unless 
otherwise noted.
F igu re  1: The A r a l Sea Basin
and a vast system of feeding canals was constructed 
to divert water to the most remote regions, mainly 
to enhance cotton production. The establishment 
of this impressive irrigation network added millions 
of hectares for agricultural production in this arid 
region.
The present water supply to irrigated areas in the 
ASB includes not only the actual water diverted 
from the rivers, but also drainage water resulting 
from agricultural return flow and wastewater. The 
remarkable increase in cotton production since the 
1960s cemented a livelihood for many but depleted 
water supplies and neglected the preservation of 
precious natural resources: the entire ASB is at 
present saddled with a water and environmental 
crisis. From both a quantity and quality or safety 
perspective, the ASB now faces one of the world's 
most critical shortages of water resources, whether 
for irrigation or for drinking.
History of the Aral Sea
Historical, geophysical, and anecdotal evidence sug­
gest that the "drying" of the Aral Sea must have 
occurred previously. It is argued that millions of 
years ago the northwestern part of present 
Uzbekistan and the southern parts of present 
Kazakhstan were covered by a vast inland sea
[Oriental Express Central Asia n.d.]. After the 
gradual receding of the water, a broad plain of 
highly saline soil became exposed, with a few 
remaining intermittent water bodies. One remnant 
of this ancient sea became the Aral Sea.2 The 
evidence further shows that in the past 9,000 
years the surface has been completely or partly 
flooded and desiccated at least eight times [Aladin 
and Plotnikov 1995; Aladin, Micklin, and Plotnikov 
2008], A t times, the level of the Aral Sea has 
fluctuated by up to  30-35 meters. All previous 
episodes of desiccation have been caused by 
climatic alteration and natural diversions of the 
feeding rivers away from the sea. The potential role 
of rainfall variations is unclear, yet there is a con­
sensus that they played a smaller role than the 
migration of the rivers [Kes and Klyukanova 1990], 
Anthropogenic contributions to the dying of the 
sea are also undeniable. Starting about 3,000 years 
ago, the region's population increased and irrigated 
agriculture commenced, leading to sizable with­
drawals and diversions of river water for irrigation 
[Micklin 1988],
2 The sea was called the Aral Tengizi ["Sea of Islands" in 
Kazakh] because it used to contain more than 1,000 
islands.
The most recent recession of the Aral Sea, how­
ever, dwarfs the previous events. In the past 
century two short periods of record high flows 
were offset by three longer dry spells in the 1960s, 
the mid-1970s, and the early 1980s. Although the 
most recent desiccation may be partly natural in 
origin, stemming from droughts or even climate 
change, it has also resulted from human mis­
management of water and ever-increasing water 
withdrawals since the 1960s from the Amu Darya 
and Syr Darya rivers for the production of "white 
gold"—cotton [Micklin 1988; Brookfield 1999], The 
combined effects of natural and human causes have 
provoked the dramatic decline of available water 
resources, which in turn has resulted in the present 
shrinkage of the Aral Sea [Saiko and Zonn 2000],
Recent Shrinkage of the Sea
In 2004 the remainder of the Aral Sea's surface 
amounted to about 17,000 km2, or 25 percent of 
its size in 1960. The water volume had decreased by 
80 percent, whereas the salt concentration had in­
creased at least five times, eradicating unique flora 
and fauna and preventing the survival of most of 
the sea's fish and wildlife. Furthermore, during this 
process the large sea separated into smaller water
bodies: the North or "Small" Aral in Kazakhstan 
and the "Large" Aral in Uzbekistan, which later 
became the "West" and "East" Aral [Micklin 2008], 
The desiccated sea floor created a new desert called 
the Aralkum Desert. By 2007 the sea's area had 
further shrunk to only 10 percent of its size in the 
1960s, and the salinity of the remaining sea sur­
passed 100 grams per liter. With continuing water 
withdrawals from the feeding rivers, the sea was 
expected to contract even further by the second or 
third decade of the 21st century, but a changing 
climate has sped up the drying even further. In 
2009 the eastern part of the "Large Aral" turned 
into a pond [Figure 2] and the western part also 
shrank considerably. In contrast, concerted efforts 
by the Kazakh government and international or­
ganizations restored the "Small Aral," through the 
construction in 2005 of the 13-kilometer-Iong, 
US$85.5 million Kok-Aral Dam and dike, which 
presently regulate the flow from the Small into the 
Large Aral. Underground water discharge from the 
original sources may find its way to the sea 
through geological layers. Yet with an estimated 4 
km3 of water per year, this underground inflow will 
not stop, let alone reverse, the desiccation.
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Drastic Consequences
The Aral Sea crisis has reached international dimen­
sions, and the environmental costs of the drying of 
the Aral Sea are enormous. The receding of the 
water line has exposed previously deposited salts, 
pesticides, and toxic substances [Micklin 2008] that 
are picked up by swirling winds and transported 
over unknown distances. The return of the polluted 
drainage water to the rivers has degraded the live­
lihoods, health, and living habitats of people in the 
ASB. The Aralkum Desert has become a source of 
toxin-laden dust storms, and inhabitants in the 
vicinity of the Aral Sea have experienced a dramatic 
rise in respiratory diseases, hepatitis, and anemia 
[Micklin 2008], The delta ecosystems have deteri­
orated considerably: by 1990 more than 95 percent 
of the marshes and wetlands had given way to 
sandy deserts, and more than 50 delta lakes, 
covering 60,000 ha, had dried up. Overgrazing 
and unsustainable agricultural practices contributed 
to this dismal situation.
In the past, the Aral Sea regulated or mitigated the 
cold north winds from Siberia and reduced the 
summer heat. The drying of the vast Aral Sea has 
thus resulted in climate changes—dryer, shorter 
summers and longer, colder winters. The effective 
growing season has been reduced from about 220 
to 170 days; pasture productivity has decreased by 
half; the destruction of vegetation has decreased 
meadow productivity by a factor of 10 [Kumar 
2002; Abdulkasimov, Alibekova, and Vakhabov 
2003],
The falling water level and increasing water salinity 
have decimated the once-flourishing fishing indus­
try that supported the local population. Millions of 
inhabitants have emigrated, unable to cope with the 
loss in jobs and increasing poverty. The accumu­
lated annual losses from the decline in economic 
activities were estimated at US$115 million, in addi­
tion to annual social losses estimated at about 
US$28.8 million over the past two decades 
[CAWATER n.d.].
The population in the ASB now faces critical chal­
lenges, such as ecological and economic instability, 
uncertainties related to ongoing climate change, 
and degradation of land and water resources, all 
leading to a worsening of livelihood conditions. To 
arrest or alleviate these negative trends, the region
needs to implement a sustainable development 
strategy that departs from the present situation. 
But what should be the basis of such a concept? 
Can the sea be refilled and its economic, social, and 
ecological services reclaimed? If so, at what cost 
and financed by whom? Or should concerted ef­
forts of the global community focus instead on 
adapting to the consequences of the crisis? Such an 
approach may be easier to finance, but would it be 
sufficient from an ecological viewpoint?
Policy Issues
“If everyone who came to study the Aral Sea had 
brought a bucket of water, the sea would be full by 
now"—this is the cynical comment made by people 
in the vicinity of what is left of the Aral Sea. This 
comment reflects their perspective on recent 
research efforts, which have been mainly short 
term in nature and of little benefit.
Starting in the 1970s, several Soviet government 
commissions carried out reclamation measures to 
prevent a further lowering of the sea level or at 
least to mitigate the social, economic, and ecologi­
cal impacts. Water management and coordination 
tasks were assigned to specially established river 
basin organizations of the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya Rivers, to  an o rgan iza tion  called 
Aralvodstroy mandated to conduct scientific and 
technical research and undertake measures for 
improving ecological and sanitary conditions in the 
Aral Sea area, and to the Aral Consortium, con­
sisting of the governments of Uzbekistan and 
Karakalpakstan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and the regional [local] authorities of 
the Aral Sea area [Schutter and Dukhovny 2003], 
By the end of the 1980s, various projects in the 
Amu Darya delta had been implemented, including 
the creation of reservoirs like the seven-square- 
kilometer Tuyamuyun. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, however, water management in 
the ASB became more complicated because there 
was no formal system for resolving conflicts among 
the five newly independent Central Asian states. 
The breakdown of the former Soviet Union also 
ended the specially developed "water-energy nexus" 
between up- and downstream countries in Central 
Asia. Since independence in 1991 in particular, the 
upstream countries have pursued self-sufficiency in 
energy based on hydropower. To satisfy their
domestic energy demands, these countries have 
released large quantities of water in winter, which 
in turn decreased the irrigation water supply 
during the growing season in the downstream 
countries. Interstate disputes over water allocation 
between the riparian countries recur annually, 
despite the acceptance of a Framework Agreement 
for the Sry Darya River in 1998 that recognized the 
water-energy nexus [Horinkova and Dukhovny
2004],
Following independence in 1991, the Central Asian 
states inherited the agricultural production systems 
developed during the Soviet era, including the inten­
sive irrigation network. But the legacy also included 
a rather fragile and degraded landscape. Outdated 
Soviet principles of water allocation and manage­
ment [UNESCO 2000] were transferred to the 
newly established Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination [ICWC], The ICWC was tasked with 
regulating water distribution in the ASB and con­
solidating country positions on a regional water 
strategy with the support of international organiza­
tions and bilateral agencies. In time, various struc­
tures were set up for the management of the ASB 
water resources—the Interstate Council on the 
Aral Sea Problems [ICAS], a high-level body 
charged with recommending actions to the gov­
ernments of the riparian states; the Executive 
Committee of the ICAS; and the International Fund 
for the Aral Sea (IFAS), a high-level body in charge 
of the financing of the ICAS (FAO 1998; Roll et al. 
2004). In 1997 the ICAS and the IFAS were merged 
into a restructured IFAS—International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea—which has a hierarchical struc­
ture (see the Annex) and is charged with making 
decisions on water and the environment in the 
ASB.
Despite the concerted efforts and the progress 
achieved in regional cooperation in the ASB, and 
despite agreements and conventions and established 
institutions, the impact of interstate cooperation 
cannot yet be seen on the ground. It is now recog­
nized that effective interstate cooperation requires 
an understanding of the roles of riparian states, the 
elaboration of a comprehensive and multilevel legal 
and institutional framework for intergovernmental 
cooperation, and the development of a political 
process in support of cooperation based on the 
principle "regional cooperation interests are above 
the national interests" (Roll et al. 2004, 8). Success­
ful interstate cooperation will require involving not
only the national administrations, but also various 
other stakeholders: national stakeholders, interna­
tional stakeholders, research organizations and 
researchers, and the regional population.
Stakeholders
National Stakeholders
Stakeholders at the national level include the prime 
decision makers in the countries within the ASB, 
including Afghanistan [the latter currently diverts 
hardly any water, but existing agreements con­
cluded during the Soviet period foresee a certain 
share of total water use for Afghanistan).
Certain lower-level authorities in the Central Asian 
countries are stakeholders with regard to water 
allocation and distribution: agricultural ministries, 
river basin organizations, water users associations, 
and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], espe­
cially in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, focusing on 
education, health, and awareness building among 
the ASB population.
International Stakeholders
Stakeholders at the international level in the ASB 
are represented by the IFAS as well as donor 
agencies and the international projects they sup­
port. These agencies include the Regional Environ­
mental Center for Central Asia, which receives 
support from international agencies to implement 
NGO development, environmental management, 
and environmental education [Roll et al. 2004). The 
Central Asian Global Water Partnership [GWP] has 
a mandate to initiate multistakeholder cooperation 
in the region. It is developing a regional network 
for sharing information and knowledge and for 
involving stakeholders—NGOs, representatives of 
economic sectors, researchers, and others—in 
water cooperation.
Researchers and Research Organizations
Research organizations are crucial for increasing 
understanding and awareness and developing sus­
tainable strategy options for coping with the Aral 
Sea problem, water management, and trans­
boundary cooperation in the ASB. These organiza­
tions have garnered support from international 
finance institutions (the World Bank, the Asian De­
velopment Bank, the U.S. Agency for International
Development], multilateral organizations [the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization [UNESCO], the United Nations 
Children's Fund [UNICEF], the United Nations De­
velopment Programme, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO], the European Union's 
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of In­
dependent States [TACIS] programme], and the 
governments of individual countries [Finland, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland], In addi­
tion, the German Ministry for Education [BMBF] 
has supported research on policy so that scientists 
and involved stakeholders can together design and 
implement a sound management plan for the ASB 
and its transboundary waters.
The Population of the Aral Sea Area
A crucial group of stakeholders is obviously the 
population living in the vicinity of the remnants of 
the Aral Sea, including Karakalpakstan and the 
Khorezm region in Uzbekistan, and south 
Kazakhstan. The population directly affected by the 
Aral Sea crisis is estimated at about 5 million 
people, of whom about 70 percent live in rural 
areas. These rural people include fishers who 
depended on the sea for income and farmers who 
depend heavily on the rivers for irrigation. The 
fishing industry was ruined by the drying of the 
sea, but the rivers still contain enough water to 
allow farming activities.
Lessons Learned
International institutions [such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme, and UNESCO] and 
others have launched various initiatives and pro­
vided financial support to assess the problems of 
the Aral Sea region and to seek solutions. Never­
theless, after years of rescue missions, the Aral Sea 
remains the worst human-caused ecological disaster 
in the world. It is a classic case of too many stake­
holders, many of whom have entered too late with 
scarce resources. At the same time, the many 
interests represented do not necessarily include 
environmental concerns.
Cooperation among stakeholders and donors has 
been only modestly successful because of their 
diverse political agendas and interests. Stakeholders 
and donor agencies must better coordinate and 
streamline their efforts [Roll et al. 2004], Since the 
late 1990s, numerous donors have come to this
"disaster epicenter," with more than 20 large-scale 
projects ongoing or in the pipeline with a total 
portfolio of about US$500 million. These projects 
focus on technical assistance and give less priority 
to changing the general mindset, creating aware­
ness, and developing institutional frameworks for 
integrated interstate water cooperation and 
management. Thus, the changes that have taken 
place in the ASB have not led to reduced water 
consumption or stopped the ongoing disappear­
ance of the Aral Sea. Although at present it hardly 
seems possible to reverse the ecological crisis in the 
ASB, legal, administrative, and economic reforms 
would be prerequisites for any feasible options for 
action [Martins et al. 2004],
Policy Options
Responses to the destruction of the sea can be 
divided in two categories: [1] refilling and restoring 
the sea; and [2] taking no action and letting 
"nature" run its course.
Refill or Restore the Sea
One solution is to increase the flow of water into 
the sea. Restoring the sea to its size of 1960—53 
meters above sea level—would require at least 73 
km3 of water to be discharged to the Aral Sea 
annually for a period of at least 20 years. Kienzler 
[2005] estimated that this period would be 24 
years, assuming that only Amu Darya River water 
would enter the sea and that Uzbekistan would 
withdraw no water for irrigation, household, and 
industry uses. Refilling the Aral Sea to its volume 
of the 1980s would require a ban on water with­
drawal from the Amu Darya River for 6-10 years 
[Kienzler 2005], But the current combination of 
low water flow into the Aral Sea and high evapora­
tion precludes filling the Aral Sea to any volume 
registered in the past.
Restoring the sea to the size of 41,000 km2, as in 
1987, would require a river inflow into the sea of 
around 30 km3 annually. Some observers consider 
this level of inflow feasible if irrigation withdrawals 
from the feeding rivers are markedly reduced. 
Practical solutions, varying in feasibility and cost, 
range from lining canals to adopting water- and 
soil-conserving agricultural cultivation methods. 
Improved irrigation techniques, improved and more 
targeted water management, and the cultivation of
crops that require less water have all been 
suggested. These options for action can be 
grouped into four clusters: [1] technical solutions; 
[2] diversion from elsewhere; [3] institutional 
solutions; and (4) political solutions.
Technical solutions. Because irrigated agriculture 
consumes about 80-95 percent of all water 
resources [K ipshakbayev and Sokolov 2002; 
Horinkova and Dukhovny 2004; Severskiy et al.
2005], efforts to improve water management must 
predominantly address agriculture in the ASB. Irri­
gated agriculture is the lifeline for the region's 
population and essential for the economies of all 
riparian states. Most of the water from the two 
feeding rivers is diverted to agriculture through an 
extensive irrigation network. Most of these canals 
are, however, poorly built, and 70 percent of them 
are unlined [Kijne 2005], In Uzbekistan alone, only 
12 percent of irrigation canals are “waterproofed" 
and much irrigation water just seeps out and adds 
to groundwater stock. At the same time, the 
average efficiency of irrigation systems (the ratio of 
water used productively in fields to headwork 
withdrawals] in the ASB remains low (Kijne 2005; 
Bekchanov, Lamers, and Martins 2010], Only about 
one third of water withdrawn from rivers for 
irrigation reaches farmers' fields directly.
Some experts consider upgrading the irrigation 
system to be a better investment than restoring the 
Aral Sea. They estimate that 10-22 km3 of water a 
year could be saved by rehabilitating and renovat­
ing irrigation systems and lining canals with con­
crete (Micklin 1988], Yet these actions are not easy 
to achieve. Lining the many kilometers of the canal 
system with concrete would require enormous 
human resources and cost an estimated US$16 
billion (Micklin 2002], Alternatively, cutting river 
water withdrawals could be achieved by reducing 
the scale of irrigated agriculture, improving water­
shed management, introducing water-wise tech­
nologies such as drip or subsoil irrigation, or 
eliminating water-intensive, low-margin crops.
A recent in-depth study by the Center for 
Development Research (ZEF] of Bonn University, 
Germany, examined the potential benefits of using 
water-wise technologies in the Khorezm region of 
northwest Uzbekistan. All water-wise options can 
contribute to reducing irrigation water demand. 
The study estimated that these technologies could 
save 1.5-3.0 km3 (or 7-16 percent of total water
consumption] in this region of 270,000 ha 
(Bekchanov, Lamers, and Martins 2010], Yet the 
application of water-wise technologies will not 
automatically increase profits because it may 
require additional investments and labor costs. For 
example, farmers could achieve potentially high 
water savings by switching from paddy rice to 
maize and aerobic rice, but at the same time, these 
changes could substantially decrease farmers' 
incomes because the new crops have lower yields 
than paddy rice. Applying animal manure to 
cotton, wheat, and potatoes has the potential to 
conserve more than 1 percent of the water 
presently applied and increase profits through 
higher yields. Improved ways of applying irrigation 
water, such as double-sided furrow irrigation,3 
alternate dry furrows, and shorter furrows, were 
estimated to save at least 0.4-0.9 percent of the 
total water applied, with relatively low investments 
required. The application of drip irrigation could 
reduce water inputs by up to 70 percent. This 
technology is financially attractive for cash crops 
but not for staples. Consequently it is feasible for 
less than 1 percent of land area and would lower 
water demand by about 0.13-0.18 percent. Laser- 
guided land leveling can reduce surface and flood 
irrigation applications in the field by up to 30 
percent (Egamberdiev et al. 2008],
Results from an analysis of the cotton value chain 
in the Khorezm region (Rudenko, Grote, and 
Lamers 2008] showed that there is potential to 
reduce water use in agriculture by introducing 
agroprocessing facilities that would, for example, 
manufacture cotton into ready-made garments. By 
shifting from merely producing cotton to 
processing textile products, the region could 
secure the same export revenue from the cotton 
value chain while reducing its production of cotton. 
This approach would release 69 percent of land 
currently used for cotton production in Khorezm 
while demanding about 0.5 km3 less water for 
irrigation annually and reducing the need for 
subsidies by US$14 million annually (Rudenko, 
Grote, and Lamers 2008],
Realizing changes in water use in the field will 
require supporting measures, such as effective and 
extended consulting as well as financial support and
3 Double-sided furrow irrigation involves apply­
ing irrigation water from both sides of the furrow at the 
same time, leading to more uniform application of water 
over the length of the furrow.
advisory services for farmers to disseminate 
knowledge. It will also require improving access to 
credit so that farmers can invest in water-wise 
technologies, and this will in turn require 
improvements in the banking system. All riparian 
states will need to exhibit strong political will and 
commitment to reducing irrigated areas or switch­
ing to less water-demanding—and less profitable— 
crops.
Diversion o f water from  elsewhere. One alternative 
to maintaining or increasing water availability in the 
rivers that feed the Aral Sea is to import water 
from other regions. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
Soviet research institutes proposed transferring 
part of the flow of the northern Volga and Ob- 
Irtysh Rivers from Siberia about 2,500 km south to 
the Amu Darya River and the Aral Sea [Figure 3],
Both rivers are far larger than the Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya. The Volga, which flows into the Caspian 
Sea, has a flow of about 240 km3 of water a year. 
The Ob-lrtysh, with a flow of around 385 km3 a 
year, flows north into the Arctic Ocean. Because
water in these rivers exceeds the water needs of 
Siberia, it was suggested that 10 percent of their 
flows be diverted to the Aral Sea annually [Ring 
2004],
The project's first stage, aimed at providing 27 km3 
of water annually, was scheduled for imple­
mentation by the late 1980s and 1990s and included 
the construction of a system of low dams, pumping 
stations, and a huge "Sibaral" canal. But in 1986 
construction and design work ceased, primarily 
because of high costs, but also because of the 
protests of Soviet scientists and intellectuals, who 
argued that the project would cause severe ecologi­
cal and cultural damage. With the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, the plan was shelved, although the 
idea has recently been reassessed by various stake­
holders. In the view of opponents, monetary costs 
and, more important, environmental costs and risks 
are high. The diversion of massive amounts of 
water [60-100 km3 annually] from Siberian rivers 
for 30 years [the amount of time required to fill 
the Aral Sea] was estimated to  cost US$30 billion 
[Temirov 2003] to US$50 billion [Ring 2004], plus
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Source: Ring 2004.
Note: Yellow areas = elevation over 200  meters.
a mammoth amount of energy.4 This energy would 
have to be generated with nuclear power unless 
highly efficient transmission lines could be built to 
import electricity. A nuclear power plant for the 
pumps could cost up to an additional US$5 billion. 
Even aside from the potential threats of a nuclear 
plant in the ASB, the environmental costs of 
changing natural river flows and the impact on the 
ecology of the Siberian plain cannot really be 
predicted. In addition, it is not clear that sufficient 
funds could be accumulated from riparian states 
and international funding organizations to sponsor 
this plan. Still, supporters of this option point to 
positive environmental effects: the ASB would be 
turned into a region suitable for fishing, agricul­
ture, and forestry in about 25-50 years [Ring 
2004], In addition, the banks of the Caspian Sea, 
which are presently threatened by inundation that 
endangers centuries-old cities, could be saved from 
the rising waters of an overabundant Volga River. 
Finally, as fresh water is removed from the Arctic 
Ocean [from Ob-Irtysh River], the gulfstream 
current could be preserved [Ring 2004].
These options for refilling the Aral Sea require not 
only huge financial and labor resources, but also a 
change in people's mindsets and perceptions of the 
natural flow of things. Micklin and Aladin [2008] 
recently proposed an expensive but easier plan to 
rescue the western part of Large Aral rather than 
trying to refill the whole sea. According to this 
plan, water losses along the Amu Darya River 
would have to be reduced through irrigation 
improvements. Increased water flow then would be 
directed through an artificial channel to the west 
and collected in a reservoir for further controllable 
release to the western Large Aral [Figure 4], 
Micklin and Aladin [2008] suggested that the plan 
would improve local climate and provide valuable 
grounds for birds and aquatic mammals. In 
addition, water salinity would drop below 15 grams 
per liter, allowing fish to return.
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Outflow toward the eastern 
basin would gradually freshen the 
western basin by carrying more 
salt out than is brought in; 
salinity could perhaps drop 
below 15 g/l, allowing fish to 
return. The eastern basin would 
become hypersaline, inhospitable 
to life except for brine shrimp and 
bacteria. Also, the Small Aral 
could further expand, reviving 
commercial fishing and shipping 
from Aralsk.
Source: Micklin and Aladin 2008.
Institutional solutions. Water use could be reduced 
through a system of incentives based, for example, 
on the introduction of water rights and water fees 
both at the user level [farmers] and at a higher level 
[governments of riparian states]. Currently, irriga­
tion water in the ASB is delivered to farmers with­
out direct fees but with low indirect fees not 
associated with its use. Introducing water charges 
and creating a water market in riparian states may 
lead to more efficient water use by farmers for 
irrigation and could help save more water at the 
regional level.
4 Every km2 of water lifted 300 meters will require giant 
pumps and pipes and 124 megawatts of power year- 
round.
Another solution is to reduce or even abolish 
irrigated agriculture in the ASB, at least for a 
period of time, to allow water from the two feed­
ing rivers to flow to the sea. No agricultural crops 
could then be produced to feed people or generate 
income for the rural population, so the interna­
tional community, for example, would have to 
compensate farmers for not cultivating. Compen­
sating rice and cotton farmers in the ASB for not 
cultivating their crops has been calculated to cost 
US$30 million annually for a rather long period. 
They could use these compensation payments to 
buy or import food crops, such as rice. This option 
would release enough water to double the present 
annual flow into the Aral Sea. The funding could 
come, for example, from the major environmental 
organizations, which spend many times that amount 
of money each year on marketing and legal fees, or 
from the corporate world, which could be con­
vinced to spend US$30 million annually for 
environmental considerations [Ring 2004],
Political solutions. Political options could also be 
used to achieve more efficient monitoring and con­
trolling of agreements on water use by all riparian 
countries. Existing agreements do not ensure 
proper water use and control. Water flows to the 
sea are not ensured, and emergency conditions are 
created [Nandalal and Simonovic 2003). Yet 
riparian countries do understand the urgent need 
to collaborate as partners to solve water manage­
ment issues and cope with the Aral Sea problem. 
These countries have drawn up several water­
sharing agreements on sustainable use of available 
resources, improvement of water quality, and 
avoidance of harm to the well-being of the coun­
tries because of water policy. But on several points 
these agreements are still ambiguous. Furthermore, 
the political and economic interests of the 
countries often differ greatly from each other and 
from the agreements' objectives. Clear identification 
of water rights among the countries and an 
assurance of adherence to agreements can help. 
Also, the introduction of defined water quality 
standards or of a "polluter" tax may significantly 
affect water use. But finding a strategy for cost 
recovery requires a willingness of water users to 
pay; taxes tend to exhibit high price elasticity [so 
people tend not to pay if taxes are too high) and 
farmers do not always see the corresponding 
benefits in the short run.
Take No Action
A second group recommends taking no action to 
refill the Aral Sea, but rather easing the conse­
quences. Many ASB residents, especially the elderly 
and the religious, believe based on historical 
evidence that the present demise of the sea is a 
recurrent event and that no active interventions are 
needed to refill it. They favor letting "nature" 
follow its course. Certain actions appear necessary, 
however, to help the inhabitants of the ASB cope 
with the degraded environment [climate, air, water, 
and soil), health problems, and poor livelihood and 
income-generating possibilities. This group advo­
cates using huge financial resources to improve 
present-day life rather than investing in the uncer­
tain future of the sea. Regional organizations and 
international donors have already devoted substan­
tial funds to programs to improve the health and 
welfare of the local population. Attempts to miti­
gate the effects of desertification include afforesta­
tion of the newly exposed seabed. At the same 
time, coping strategies should be financially feasible 
and doable. They could have a major impact in the 
region.
Some researchers argue that instead of spending 
enormous amounts of energy, research, and funds 
on the long-term and potentially unsuccessful 
restoration of the sea, it would make more sense to 
improve the ecosystem in the ASB by rehabilitating 
wetlands and numerous smaller water bodies. This 
effort would preserve what is left of the Amu 
Darya and Syr Darya deltas, as well as strengthen 
ecosystems and biodiversity, as was achieved by the 
Sudoche Lake Rehabilitation Project initiated in 
1989.
One more issue guiding the supporters of the 
"take no action" plan is the recently discovered 
large deposits of gas and oil in the Aralkum. 
Extraction of these resources would render 
Uzbekistan among the major players in the global 
power sector in the coming years. Hence 
Uzbekistan shows little interest in reducing the 
diversion of the Amu Darya River for irrigated 
agriculture, but instead intends to explore for oil in 
the drying South Aral seabed [Fletcher 2007). Not 
refilling the sea will make the extraction of gas or 
oil for Uzbekistan less expensive and less labor- and 
technology-intensive than it would be on a refilled 
seabed. It is far from clear, however, what the con­
sequences of oil and gas exploitation would be for 
the Aral Sea.
Assignment
Your assignment is to  formulate policy recom­
mendations for the riparian states in Central Asia 
to deal with the problems identified in this case.
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